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Trump Counterterrorism: The Five Foundations for Success 
Richard English 
 
Introduction 
The counterterrorist challenges faced by each new US administration are unique. But 
reflection on the long history of terrorism and counterterrorism might yield some valuable 
elements of an effective approach, and this article humbly proposes five such lines of thinking in 
relation to the Donald Trump Presidency. Central to the argument is the crucial reality that 
terrorism and counterterrorism exist in a mutually shaping relationship,1 and that it has been 
state responses to terrorism that have most shaped historical change, rather than the acts of non-
state terrorists themselves. Put another way, much of what develops across world politics and 
international relations over coming years will be determined by the choices that President Trump 
and those around him take in response to the challenge of terrorism. 
 
1. What the Administration will have to deal with is terrorisms, rather than terrorism. 
This is a vital point, and it must be borne in mind in relation to all counterterrorist 
decisions and policies during the Trump Administration’s time in office. In the wake of the 9/11 
atrocity, there was an understandable urge to do something about terrorism as such. But the 
dynamics of terrorism, and of effective counterterrorism, always rely ultimately on recognizing 
what is unique about each terrorist organization, cause, or threat that is faced. There are many 
diverse terrorist groups and actors across the globe, of course. But even if one considers jihadist 
terrorism (the most high-profile challenge in the terrorist arena as far as President Trump is 
likely to be concerned), it is very much terrorisms rather than terrorism that he will need to 
address. Jihadists in ISIS differ in significant ways from those in the enduring world of al-
Qa’ida;2 ISIS in Syria represents different levels of difficulty from ISIS within Iraq; lone actors in 
the West who identify with ISIS operate according to frequently different dynamics again (lone-
actor violence often involving very different origins and processes from group-based terrorism).3 
Much current commentary unhelpfully conflates what are ultimately different terrorisms. 
To protect Americans against lone-actor threats involves understanding the precise world of 
                                                            
1 R. English (ed.), Illusions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
2 F. A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); B. Hoffman and F. 
Reinares (eds), The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
3 P. Gill, Lone-Actor Terrorists: A Behavioural Analysis (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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operation (and effective counter-operation) that the evidence suggests to be necessary in relation 
to such terrorists; limiting ISIS’s effectiveness in Syria is a different matter, requiring different 
strategies and understanding. This has implications for the use of specialist expertise. Often, 
what is required is not so much terrorist experts, but rather terrorist expertise combined with 
deep regional wisdom and knowledge as offered in policy-friendly analysis. I have yet to meet, 
for example, a first-class historian of Iraq who thought that what had been promised about the 
likely effects of 2003 regime change in that country was even faintly plausible. Had such voices 
been seriously heeded at the time, and the post-invasion fiasco been avoided, then we would not 
now be facing ISIS. In order not to worsen the situation regarding terrorism over coming years, 
President Trump must listen carefully to those various kinds of expert who know in detail about 
the different forms of terrorism with which he has to deal, and about the different historical 
contexts within which they have each emerged. 
 
2. The Administration must be realistic (internally, as well as publicly) about what might 
reasonably be expected to be achieved in the field of counterterrorism. 
I have been influenced recently by the work of UCLA’s Steven Spiegel and his colleagues 
regarding the United States’ efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. 4  This scholarship 
demonstrates how incredibly difficult it is to make serious progress in reducing terrorist violence 
even in what has been a high-priority area of counterterrorist regional policy for the United 
States. Many other cases reinforce the point. The Northern Ireland Peace Process (one of the 
most successful endeavors to reduce terrorist violence) is a process which has now gone on as 
long as did the conflict to which it brought something like an end;5 and even here, at time of 
writing, the political process so generated is faltering,6 and terrorist violence (albeit at a much 
reduced level) still persists. 
This insight has implications for Syria and Iraq, which will clearly preoccupy the 
president significantly and which have far larger global implications than Northern Ireland. But 
it is also important for dealings with Israel/Palestine, with Colombia, and with the various 
terrorist challenges faced by Russia and China and on which the Trump regime will need to have 
a stance. 
                                                            
4 S. L. Spiegel et al, The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013). 
5 R. English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2012; 1st edn 2003). 
6 See, for example, the much-publicized resignation letter from the then Deputy First Minister of 
Northern Ireland, Martin McGuinness, of January 9, 2017, which precipitated the collapse of the 
Northern Ireland Executive. 
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I have argued elsewhere that one of the implications of a close reading of the long history 
of terrorism is that we must learn to live with it rather than pretend that we can eradicate it 
entirely.7 To exaggerate what can be achieved merely gives gifts to one’s terrorist opponents, who 
can then present their continued existence and operation as, in themselves, a kind of victory. For 
all of the seeming demands for public rhetoric, I still think that President Trump’s Inaugural 
Speech declaration—’we will eradicate [radical Islamic terrorism] completely from the face of the 
earth’ (January 20th, 2017)—sets the bar of expectation far too high. One of the areas of success 
open to terrorists is the maintenance of resistance in the face of state hostility.8 To state publicly 
that you are going to achieve things in counterterrorism that are simply not achievable gives 
another gift to your terrorist adversaries. This should be avoided.  
Likewise, there should emerge as far as possible a realistic set of expectations among the 
US public about what can and cannot be achieved. Not every terrorist attack can be prevented, 
and people should recognize this, just as they can be reassured that their likelihood of being a 
victim of such an attack is incredibly small in practice.  
In all of this, it is again vital to remember that it is the relationship between terrorism and 
counterterrorism which most changes history. Every major decision by a state, and every claim 
about what a state will do in relation to terrorism, will affect the shape of the terrorisms that it 
faces. In the case of the post-9/11 decision to engage in Iraq, and to justify this partly in relation 
to the terrorist threat, the outcomes have been far from entirely benign. Strikingly, the then 
senior CIA man who lastingly interrogated Saddam Hussein after his capture, makes the 
depressing observation that, “The rise of Islamic extremism in Iraq, chiefly under the rubric of 
ISIS (or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham), is a catastrophe that the United States needn’t have 
faced had it been willing to live with an aging and disengaged Saddam Hussein.”9 
Part of the problem here arose from overconfidence in regard to what could be done to 
reshape the world after the 9/11 attacks, and an exaggerated expectation of what it was feasible 
to achieve. In regard to what is now faced in relation to ISIS, there must be recognition about 
how little will be achievable purely through military means, and also about how lengthy a 
problem ISIS and its Syrian and Iraqi setting are likely to prove. 
 
 
                                                            
7 R. English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
8 R. English, Does Terrorism Work? A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
9 J. Nixon, Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein (London: Bantam Press, 2016), p. 
1. 
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3. The Administration must be coordinated and unified in its counterterrorism, both within the 
US state, and in terms of its external alliances. 
Effective coordination is a central element in successful counterterrorism. It is also 
depressingly difficult to achieve. Different wings of the same state find it understandably hard 
enough to liaise smoothly with one another, while dealings between states are more complex and 
awkward still. In Europe, efforts to ensure that the European Union works as a unified 
counterterrorist actor made progress after 9/11 and amid ensuing dangers; but they also came up 
against the repeated pattern of national attitudes, structures, and approaches getting in the way 
of effective coordination.10 The challenges faced here are hardly likely to ease in the wake of the 
UK’s departure from the European Union. For the Trump Administration, the difficulty of 
ensuring coordination between police forces, agencies, and other US state actors represents an 
inherited challenge of serious proportions (not least given the tense relationship that initially 
existed between the incoming president and the US Intelligence Community). But where 
counterterrorist efforts in the past century have been most successful, one element has been the 
establishing of unity of action and purpose and cooperation between different wings of the state 
in question.11 Moreover, positive relationships with key allies internationally should be a priority. 
This will include consideration of Middle Eastern players (Israel, obviously, but also Jordan in a 
decisive manner too); it will also include the patient pursuit of strong relations with key 
European allies, and the avoidance of negative blowback regarding terrorism when the US 
engages with Russia and China. 
 
4. The Administration must communicate a sustainedly credible series of messages about 
terrorism. 
Credibility derives both from the content of the message, and from the perceptions 
people have regarding the person delivering the message to them. President Trump enjoys great 
credibility with sections of the United States population not always sympathetic to 
Washingtonians. This is a great resource. He has famous difficulties in regard to credibility with 
many others in the country, and internationally he has yet to establish himself as a figure whose 
pronouncements on major issues carry enough high seriousness.  
The long history of terrorism provides many examples of states damaging and 
undermining themselves through making incredible claims. States frequently depict terrorist 
                                                            
10 J. Argomaniz, The EU and Counterterrorism: Politics, Polity and Policies after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 
2011). 
11 W. Matchett, Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA (Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd, 2016). 
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adversaries as being devoid of political support, as being motivated by mere criminality, as being 
characterized by mental illness, as being short of political purpose, when much of the time these 
diagnoses are demonstrably false. Every time the Trump Administration delivers a public 
statement on terrorism, and every time it endeavors to develop a policy regarding terrorism, it 
should consider the various audiences that are involved. If what is said or planned would seem 
implausible to potential recruits from the terrorists’ constituency, or could be falsified by the 
terrorists themselves, then the Administration will have done itself considerable harm. The fact 
that most terrorist organizations rely on sane people with some measure of political commitment 
does not in any way legitimate those groups’ murderous violence. But to deny these realities—
whether dealing with jihadists or with other kinds of terrorist actors—makes counterterrorism 
more difficult rather than easier. 
One particular area of importance for the Trump regime will be the relationship between 
Islam and terrorism. It has been too tempting for some politicians and commentators in the 
twenty-first century to present casually the connection between Islam and terrorist violence. In 
truth, the relationship is complex. While many Muslim terrorists do find at least part of their 
motivation and justification in the realm of religious belief, it is also true that the vast majority of 
the world’s Muslims have no sympathy for jihadist terrorism, that relations between Islam and 
the major non-Muslim communities in the world has been and remains benign,12 and that where 
there is a connection between Islam and terrorism it normally concerns very particular sub-sets of 
Islamic belief and practice. Here, the dynamics might indeed be important to recognize, whether 
one judges this to involve the particular lethality of certain kinds of religious cults due to their 
capacity to weed out shirkers and defectors,13 or the possible elements of certain forms of Islam 
as they appeal to certain kinds of personality types.14 
But such arguments are some distance from any crass suggestion of an automatic or 
inevitable causal relationship between Islamic faith and terrorism. And any statements from the 
president or those around him that concern religion and terrorism must be credible, and must 
acknowledge (for example) that the vast majority of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims utterly 
despise jihadist terrorism. To take a different approach will be to lose credibility across much of 
the Muslim world (which could be disastrous) and indeed to worsen the disaffection that exists 
against the United States. 
                                                            
12 J. Sacks, Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2015); D. 
Cannadine, The Undivided Past: History Beyond Our Differences (London: Penguin, 2013). 
13 E. Berman, Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2009). 
14 D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and 
Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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Moreover, adhering to evidence-based, credible, and calm assessments of terrorism can 
still allow for confidence that one’s arguments against terrorists will prove damaging to the latter. 
Indeed, close scrutiny of the arguments and politics of terrorists over many decades suggests that 
states’ own arguments, patiently and calmly articulated, can indeed tend to undermine their 
terrorist opponents as long as the state adheres to credible interpretations and analyses.15 To offer 
arguments that lack credibility and which can be falsified—whether in terms of the nature of 
terrorism itself, its causes, or the prospects for defeating it—would do more harm to President 
Trump than to his violent opponents. 
 
5. The Administration must maintain an appropriate sense of the true scale of the threat, and 
therefore adopt a proportional level of response. 
One of the most striking aspects of terrorism is that it seizes attention on a far greater 
scale than it actually does damage in practice. This point has been emphasized repeatedly in the 
scholarly literature: ‘although the yearly chance an American will be killed by a terrorist within 
the country is about one in 4 million under present conditions, around 40 percent of Americans 
have professed, in polls taken since late 2001, that they worry they or a family member will 
become a victim of a terrorist’.16 A broader point about the degree of threat to the United States 
as such is equally vital: ‘The actual danger of the new international terrorist networks to the 
regimes of stable states in the developed world…remains negligible’.17 
This is not to deny the possibility that a larger-scale threat might emerge in the future 
from non-state terrorist sources, and of course the Trump Administration must assess that threat 
carefully and responsibly. The point, however, is that as things stand, the threat of terrorism to 
the United States is far, far less great than, say, the threat from climate change. Moreover, to 
exaggerate the degree of terrorist threat can provide the basis for those unhelpful overreactions 
that (from France to the United Kingdom to Israel to the United States itself) have so often 
made terrorists’ causes easier to sustain throughout modern history. Revenge for violence against 
one’s community has repeatedly been a key motivation for terrorists and a crucial means of their 
recruiting activists.18 Military and other forms of state over-reaction (including the ill-judged use 
of torture against terrorist suspects) have repeatedly made such revenge easier for terrorists to 
deploy in their campaigns against Western and other states. So the Trump Administration must 
                                                            
15 English, Does Terrorism Work? 
16 J. Mueller and M. G. Stewart, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), p. 7. 
17 E. Hobsbawm, Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism (London: Little, Brown, 2007), p. 135. 
18 L. Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray, 2006). 
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resist the temptation to exaggerate the threat, and it must avoid overreaction and an overreliance 
on military methods of countering terrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
I am fully aware how different are the challenges involved, respectively, in running a 
major country and in merely offering academic analysis such as that which is included in this 
article. Moreover, I have no expectation that policymakers in Washington will attend closely to 
what a mere university professor says on this subject. But the importance of some form of such 
reflection about the history of terrorism seems to me unarguable. To approach any major policy 
challenge without deep reflection on the long inheritance that a new president encounters in that 
field would make their job more difficult. Here, I am making five main points. 
• What the Administration will have to deal with is terrorisms, rather than 
terrorism. 
• The Administration must be realistic (internally, as well as publicly) about what 
might reasonably be expected to be achieved in the field of counterterrorism. 
• The Administration must be coordinated and unified in its counterterrorism, both 
within the US state, and in terms of its external alliances. 
• The Administration must communicate a sustainedly credible series of messages 
about terrorism. 
• The Administration must maintain an appropriate sense of the true scale of the 
threat, and therefore adopt a proportional level of response. 
 
No counterterrorist policy will save every life. But the long history of terrorism and 
counterterrorism seems to me to suggest that adherence to the above five principles would enable 
President Trump to protect many lives and limbs from terrorism during his time in office. 
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